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1

PETITION FOR REHEARING
Defendant, appellant, and cross-appellee Bank of Utah
(hereinafter Bank), pursuant to Rule 35, U.R.A.P., petitions the
court for rehearing of its decision filed September 4, 1992, in
the above-referenced matter on the grounds that the court
overlooked or misapprehended the following points of law or fact:
1.

The fundamental legal issue in this case was whether

plaintiff, appellee and cross-appellant Ivan J. Heslop
(hereinafter Heslop) was constructively discharged by the Bank.
Even assuming the Bank requested Heslop1s resignation, there was
insufficient evidence, as a matter of law, to support the jury!s
verdict that Heslop was constructively discharged.

The court

failed to address this fundamental issue.
2.

Heslop1s evidence of constructive discharge "is

inherently contradictory or incredible", and therefore fails to
meet the requirement that the jury's verdict of constructive
discharge be supported by substantial evidence.
3.

The case should be remanded for a new trial on all

issues because the facts and issues with respect to the Court!s
remand for new trial on Heslop1s tort public policy claim are so
intertwined with the facts and issues related to the constructive
discharge and implied-in-fact contract claims that they cannot
adequately be separated.

In order to b£ fair to both parties, a

new trial should be held on all issues.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT, AS A MATTER OF
LAW, TO ESTABLISH CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE.
The central issue in this case was whether Heslop "quit" or
whether he was constructively discharged, as shown by the first
question of the Special Verdict inquiring whether Heslop
voluntarily quit his job.
644.)

(Record on Appeal, hereinafter R.,

Jury Instructions 15 and 16 further show that the case was

one of constructive discharge, not express termination.
620)

(R. 619,

Notwithstanding that constructive discharge was the basic

and overriding issue in the case, the legal requirements for a
constructive discharge are never discussed nor so much as
mentioned in the Court's opinion.
The Court's apparent rationale for disregarding this
specific issue was Heslopfs testimony that the Bank asked for his
resignation.

With respect to the sufficiency of the evidence to

support the jury's verdict, the Court stated:
The Bank also ignores the crucial testimony
of Heslop that he was asked to resign and the
letter he presented that tends to support his
testimony. [emphasis added]
The Bank did not ignore this testimony.
two basic points:

Instead, it argued

First, that even assuming a demand for

Heslop1s resignation, the evidence was insufficient, as a matter
of law, to constitute a constructive discharge; and, second, that
the evidence was insufficient, as a matter of law, to support a
2
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finding that Heslop was asked to resign by the Bank.
The Court's opinion recognizes that either of these points
can be a basis for finding the evidence was insufficient to
support the jury's verdict.

The court stated:

Absent a legal argument that Heslop1s
evidence fails to support a crucial element
of his claims or that his evidence is
inherently contradictory or incredible, we
will not invade the province of jurors to
determine Heslop1s credibility or to reverse
their decision. [Emphasis added]
Therefore, if there is a legal argument that Heslop1s
evidence does not support a crucial element of his claim, or if
his evidence is inherently contradictory or incredible, the Court
should reverse the jury!s decision.

The Bank respectfully

submits that the Court misapprehended both the law and crucial
facts related to the constructive discharge issue which, if
thoroughly addressed, would result in a finding, as a matter of
law, that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's
verdict on that point.
1. A Request for Resignation is Insufficient to Constitute
Constructive Discharge.
Assuming the facts most favorable to Heslop, he was asked to
resign approximately five days after his lending authority was
revoked.

According to Heslop's testimony, which was accepted by

the jury, the trial court on motion for JNOV or new trial, and
now by the Supreme Court on appeal, this request for resignation
was made in light of the following facts and circumstances:
First, Heslop had an employment contract with the Bank terminable
3
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

only for good cause.

Specifically, Heslop testified he was

expressly informed in 1962 that the Bank would terminate him only
for good cause.

Second, at the time Heslop resigned, the Bank

did not have good cause to terminate him.
Heslop has steadfastly asserted the two above-stated
positions both before and throughout this litigation.

Since he

believed he could only be terminated for cause and further, that
the Bank had no good cause, Heslop therefore knew he could not be
required to resign.

Yet he nonetheless submitted his written

resignation.
As a matter of law, this is a voluntary resignation and not
a constructive discharge.

The Bank cited cases in support of

this position, which are not mentioned or discussed anywhere in
the Court's opinion.

In Knee v. School Dist. No. 139, in Canyon

Cty, 106 Idaho 152, 676 P.2d 727 (1984) the Idaho Court of
Appeals addressed this very issue.

It held that an employee who

had a contract terminable only for cause was not constructively
discharged despite his resignation upon demand by his employer
but without any showing of cause.
The court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of
plaintifffs constructive discharge case and held that a prudent
person in plaintiff's position "could not have believed he had
been terminated" even though the school board demanded his
resignation and refused to give him even one night to think about

4
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Heslop has previously argued that Knee is distinguishable
because the employee was a school superintendent who had a
written contract.
a difference.

The Bank submits that is a distinction without

The critical principle in Knee was that the

employee had a contract terminable only for cause and the
employer gave no cause for the demanded resignation.

By Heslop1s

own testimony, those same factors were present in the instant
case.

The Idaho Court of Appeals stated:
. . . It is not appropriate to apply the
doctrine of constructive discharge absent
facts showing harassment, intimidation,
coercion or other aggravating conduct on the
part of the employer which renders working
conditions intolerable. . . . A mere request
to resign, without more, is not sufficient to
warrant a finding of constructive discharge.
676 P.2d at 730.

Likewise, in Christie v. San Miguel Cty.

School Dist.,759 P.2d 779 (Colo. App. 1988), the Colorado
appellate court affirmed the trial court's granting of a directed
verdict in favor of the defendant employer, finding no
constructive discharge, as a matter of law, even though the
plaintiff employee was first demoted and later expressly
requested to resign.

The court stated:

A request for a resignation will not
support a claim of constructive discharge
unless accompanied by harassment, coercion,
or other employer conduct which makes the
working conditions intolerable.
759 P.2d at 783.

In Wilson v. Bd. of Cty. Comfrs. of Cty.

of Adams, 703 P.2d 1257 (Colo. 1985) the Colorado Supreme Court
reversed a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff employee and
5
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held, as a matter of law, that the evidence was insufficient to
support a finding of constructive discharge even though plaintiff
was specifically told she would be terminated if she did not
return to work by a date certain and accept primary
responsibility as "back-up" receptionist, a change in assignment
which had resulted in plaintiff's initial leaving her job.
In an analogous case, Wilkinson v. Trust Co. of Georgia
Assoc,, 128 Ga. App. 473, 197 S.E.2d 146 (1973), the plaintiff
employee resigned after taking "a two months1 leave of absence
with pay, in order to think about his employment situation."

197

S.E.2d at 148. The court stated:
Even if it is shown that the plaintiff
resigned under pressure at his employer's
request, this did not amount to a discharge.
197 S.E.2d at 148.

See also Dusanek v. Hannon, 677 F.2d 538

(7th Cir. 1982) where the court indicated "that a resignation [by
a tenured public employee entitled to constitutional rights of
due process] resulting from a choice between resigning or facing
proceedings for dismissal is not tantamount to discharge by
coercion without procedural review if the employee is given
sufficient time and opportunity for deliberation of the choice
posed.

jCd. at 543. The court reversed the jury's verdict in

favor of the employee.

This Court's opinion affirming the jury's

verdict in favor of Heslop on the constructive discharge issue is
grounded on the proposition that a request for resignation, is
sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict.

The Bank

6
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respectfully submits this is a misapprehension of the law as
indicated by the cases cited above and requests rehearing for the
Court to specifically address the issue that a request for
resignation is not sufficient, as a matter of law, to establish
constructive discharge in this case.
2. Heslop's Evidence that He was Asked to Resign is
Inherently Contradictory or Incredible.
Heslop was the only witness who testified that he was asked
to resign by the Bank.

Although Heslop called several witnesses

who had been employees at the Bank at the same time he resigned,
not one of them corroborated his testimony that the Bank demanded
his resignation.

Most of those witnesses were no longer employed

at the Bank at the time of the trial. Although the Bank
recognizes a jury is entitled to believe one witness as opposed
to several others, it respectfully submits that Heslop1s evidence
that he was asked to resign is inherently contradictory or
incredible for several reasons.

For example, Heslop initiated

this action by filing a 12 page complaint dated June 2, 1987,
nearly four years after he resigned.

(R. 1-12)

There are five

pages of detailed factual allegations contained in the complaint.
With respect to Heslop1s resignation, the allegations in the
complaint directly contradict his testimony that the Bank
demanded his resignation.

Paragraphs 20 and 21 of the complaint

state:
20. In August or September, 1983, a loan
made by Plaintiff to a Dr. Clayton Gabbert
was called into question by Timmons.
7
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Although not standard practice, an extensive
list of questions regarding the loan was
delivered to Plaintiff. Plaintiff was
accused of making an agricultural loan in
violation of bank Policy against such loans.
The loan, although made to a medical doctor
for an investment, was secured by cattle.
Even though the Officer1s Loan Committee
approved the loan, Timmons deemed it an
agricultural loan because cattle were used as
security and subsequently terminated
Plaintiff1s lending authority altogether.
Timmons1 accusations against Plaintiff were
merely a pretext for forcing Plaintiff's
resignation.
21. Without lending authority and the
ability to authorize agricultural loans,
Plaintiff was unable to function in his job
at the bank. In October, Plaintiff
petitioned the Board of Directors for a
chance to argue his position that Timmons1
policy and order should be rescinded.
Plaintiff explained that he was being
unfairly disciplined and would be forced to
resign without such a recision. Plaintiff
was subsequently informed that his
resignation had been accepted, and that the
Directors wished to receive it in writing.
Plaintiff was given an opportunity to argue
his position before the Board, but the result
was a foregone conclusion. The Directors
listened to his argument, but asked no
questions. Plaintiff's official date of
termination was October 18, 1983, the date to
which he was paid, although he was asked to
leave the bank October 5, 1983. [emphasis
added]
One looks in vain for an allegation that the Bank demanded
Heslop's resignation.
opposite is alleged.

It is not there.

In fact, just the

Heslop states that he told the Board he

would be forced to resign because he considered the suspension o
his lending authority to be unfair discipline which made him
unable to function in his job.

This is inherently contradictory
8
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with his testimony at trial and therefore makes it incredible.
The allegations in paragraph 21, however, do support the
testimony of Ed Kleyn at trial, which was that he told Heslop
whatever he decided to do, it should be put in writing.
(Transcript 775-76, 1475)
A careful reading of Heslop1s letter of resignation also
shows it is inherently contradictory with his testimony that the
Bank demanded his resignation.

The letter states:

At your request I am submitting in
writing my notice of resignation from the
Bank of Utah to be effective Oct. 18, 1983.
I find the restriction of Mr. Timmons of not
allowing me any lending authority and the
bank unwilling to grant agricultural purpose
loans to be unbearable.
The October 18th date allows the Board of
Directors sufficient time to rescind Mr.
Timmons1 directive and to negotiate with me
should they desire to do so. [emphasis
added] [Exh. 21P]
Heslop clearly ties his resignation to the suspension of his
lending authority and the Bank's unwillingness to grant
agricultural loans, not to a demand for his resignation.

The

fact Heslop states he is allowing the Board time to rescind
Timmons1 directive (the suspension of his lending authority) and
to negotiate with Heslop directly is clearly inconsistent with
testimony that the Bank demanded his resignation.

These inherent

contradictions make his evidence incredible.
Further evidence shows the inherent contradiction in
Heslop1s testimony that his resignation was demanded.
9
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Heslop

prepared notes from which he read when he spoke to the Board of
Directors on October 6, 1983, at least two days after Ed Kleyn
allegedly called Heslop and told him the Bank wanted his
resignation.

[Exh. 22P] Nowhere in these notes does Heslop

state that his resignation was demanded by the Bank.

Moreover,

contrary to the Court's statement in its opinion that Heslop told
the Board "he would continue employment with the Bank so long as
he received a reasonable assignment", Heslopfs own notes state:
"My resignation is effective 10/18 unless you terminate my
employment beforehand. . . . I am available for assignment from
you within reason until October 18th should you wish."
The lack of any independent corroboration of Heslop!s
testimony also makes it inherently incredible.

Heslop1s own

witnesses included Ed Kleyn, Gerald West, and Boyd Carlsen.

Each

of these individuals were directly involved with the Gabbert
loan, which precipitated the suspension of Heslop1s lending
authority.

Yet not one of them testified that the Bank demanded

Heslop1s resignation.

Kleyn testified to the exact opposite.

Heslop also called Gerald Peacock, the Bank's former internal
auditor, and James Packer, a former officer and director, as
witnesses.

They also did not corroborate Heslop1s testimony that

the Bank demanded his resignation.

None of these people were

employed at the Bank at the time of trial.

Three of them (West,

Carlsen, and Peacock) testified that the Bank either expressly
fired them or forced them out.

They certainly had no interest in
10
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protecting the Bank.

It is incredible that in an organization

the size of the Bank, Heslop could not find even one person who
had so much as heard that the Bank demanded his resignation in
October 1983.
Heslopfs evidence that he was asked to resign "is inherently
contradictory or incredible", and this Court should so hold and
should reject that evidence as a basis to sustain the jury's
verdict.

Without that evidence, there is insufficient remaining

evidence, as a matter of law, to affirm the jury's verdict of
constructive discharge.
POINT II
IF A NEW TRIAL IS TO BE HELD, IT SHOULD
ENCOMPASS ALL ISSUES, AND NOT JUST THE PUBLIC
POLICY AND CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGE ISSUES.
Where the issues at trial are inseparably intermingled or
intertwined, so that remanding for a new trial on only part of
those issues would be unfair to the parties, the court should
order a new trial on all issues.

See Hyland v. St. Mark's

Hospital, 19 U.2d 134, 427 P.2d 736 (1967).
In the employment context, this issue arose in Boulder
Valley School Dist. R-2 v. Price, 805 P.2d 1085 (Colo. 1991),
where the jury returned a verdict that Price was constructively
discharged.

The trial court granted defendants1 motion for JNOV.

The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed the entry of JNOV,
modified the damage award so that defendants were jointly and
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severally liable, and remanded for a new trial on the issue of
punitive damages.
On further appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the
Court of Appeal's reversal of the granting of JNOV, i.e., the
Supreme Court affirmed the jury's verdict that Price was
constructively discharged.

However, the Supreme Court reversed

the Court of Appeal's modification of the judgment regarding
joint and several liability and also reversed the court's holding
that the burden of proof for punitive damages was by a
"preponderance of the evidence."
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's affirmance of the jury's
finding of constructive discharge, it ordered a new trial on all
issues.

It stated that "[t]he issues of liability and damages in

this case are so intertwined that the proper resolution is to
have a new trial on all the issues.

Id. at 1094.

In Hyland v. St. Mark's Hospital, supra, the trial court
granted JNOV for the plaintiff on the issue of liability and
ordered a new trial solely on the issue of damages.

Although the

Supreme Court affirmed the granting of a new trial, it held that
it should be on all issues, not just damages.

The court stated:

Notwithstanding the fact that the trial
court's ruling does not impress us as wholly
unreasonable, out of a desire to be fair to
both sides, we believe that justice would
best be served by removing any restriction on
it. . . . The questions relating to the
plaintiff's injury, how it happened, who was
at fault, and the pain and injury occasioned
thereby, are so intermingled that if there is
to be a new trial, in fairness to both
parties it should be on all issues.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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427 P.2d 738.

(emphasis added)

In the instant case, the

Court has ordered a new trial on the claim that Heslop was
terminated in violation of public policy and on the issue of
consequential damages, including attorney's fees.

In order to

try the public policy claim, essentially all of the same evidence
that was presented in the first trial will need to be presented
again.

All of the background information on Heslop1s employment

with the Bank, the positions he held, the hiring of Timmons, the
reorganization of the Bank, the Gabbert loan, will all have to be
presented again.

These are the same facts submitted to establish

a constructive discharge, an implied in fact contract, and the
question of whether there was good cause to terminate.

They

would also obviously have a bearing on the issue of damages, if
any, and specifically questions about punitive damages.

Since

all these facts and issues are intermingled and interwoven, the
Bank respectfully submits that in order to be fair to both sides,
the Court should require a retrial of all issues, not just the
ones identified in the Court's opinion.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Bank respectfully
requests that the court grant its petition for rehearing.
Counsel for the Bank certifies that this petition is presented in
good faith and not for delay.
DATED this

//

day of September, 1992.
STRONG/OlANNI

Glenn C. Hanni
Stuart H. Schultz
Attorneys for Bank of Utah
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